Three months after the August 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country’s founding president, the United States government had agreed to provide asylum to Khandkar Mushtaque Ahmed, the man who became president after the violent coup.
The offer was made by Henry Kissinger, the then US secretary of state, after Mushtaque had, through his private secretary, asked the US ambassador to provide asylum both for the new president and Majors Farooq and Rashid, the two men who had spearheaded the plot to kill Mujib.
The request was made just as a counter coup was taking place in Dhaka led by Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf.
The US authorities did not need to make a decision about the two army Majors as just hours after the request, the Bangladesh government sprinted Majors Farooq and Rashid along with 15 other army officers and their families out of Dhaka to Bangkok.
However, after a flurry of diplomatic correspondence over two days, Kissinger informed the US ambassador in Dhaka in a cable dated 5 November, ‘You may tell Mushtaque that he would be welcome in the United States if he desires to come here.’
The cable appears to suggest that whilst asylum for Mushtaque was unconditional, a similar provision of refuge for ‘a small number of other officials’ whom the president wanted to bring – as well as the use of a US plane -- would be dependent on agreement with the new leaders of the counter coup.
Mushtaque and his colleagues did not need to take up the offer as shortly afterwards Mosharraf was himself ousted and murdered in the ‘sepoy’ mutiny that resulted in Ziaur Rahman again becoming chief of army staff, and Musthaque being re-offered the position of president, which this time he refused. Chief justice ASM Sayem, appointed by Mosharraf as president, continued in that position.
The story is recounted in a series of cables – many of which were designated ‘secret’ at the time -- declassified in 2006. These cables have now been made accessible on a Wikileaks website.
The US government first heard about Brigadier Mosharraf’s counter coup when the president himself phoned the US ambassador in Dhaka Davis Eugene Boster at 8.30 in the morning on 3 November 1975.
Recounting the conversation shortly afterwards in a cable, the ambassador wrote that Mushtaque Ahmed had told him ‘Mosharraf had done it.’
‘He said that he did not know what to do in this situation but in thinking of the friends of Bangladesh he had thought of me and had decided to call and let me know of the situation,’ Boster writes of his conversation with Mushtaque.
He concluded, ‘If there is anything you can do, I leave the matter to you.’
Six hours later, at 2.20 pm, the US ambassador received a call from the principal secretary to the president, Mahbub Alam Chashi.
In a cable describing the conversation, labeled as ‘secret,’ Boster said Chashi told him, ‘The president had directed him to inquire whether, if the situation should so demand, “Certain persons in Bangladesh” could be given asylum. Would that be acceptable to us, he asked. I asked if the persons referred to were the two Majors (Farooq and Rashid) and the secretary replied “yes”.’
The ambassador records that he had told Chashi, ‘It was not our usual practice to grant asylum overseas and thus could not give him an encouraging reply,’ but that he would look into it due to the ‘gravity of the situation’ and because the private secretary was calling ‘at the direction of the president’.
The cable then states that Chashi had told him that ‘beyond the two Majors, the president might also wish to follow their course. I asked him to repeat that and the secretary reiterated that the president himself may wish to act at the same time and request asylum, as well as some of the president’s colleagues.’
A few minutes later Chashi phoned the ambassador back to clarify that, ‘the arrangements described to me were conditional on a negotiated settlement with the forces with whom they were negotiating.’
Soon after this conversation took place, the Bangladesh authorities put the two Majors and other army officers on a plane to Bangkok.
At 8.30 pm the same day, the ambassador had a further conversation with the president’s secretary in which, according to another cable written by him, Chashi had said that although the application for asylum relating to the Majors had been overtaken by events, ‘there was still outstanding the question of the president’s possible desire to request asylum that he had discussed with me.’
The next morning on 4th November, in another phone conversation, Chashi told the ambassador that two other top officials-- Major General M Khaliur Rahman, the chief of Defence staff and General Osmany, the defence advisor, who had in 1971 been the head of Bangladesh liberation forces, also sought to come with the president.
The cable goes on to record that the presidential adviser said that ‘it was not necessarily to the US that the party would wish to move and that it looked more and more like the UK.’ However, he added that events were moving in a direction ‘which would probably not require them to utilise any offer of assistance such as they have from us.’
In a part of the cable titled, ‘Comment,’ Boster writes, ‘I no longer believe that an offer of asylum is essential to avert widespread bloodshed since the evacuation of the Majors and other military personnel has defused the situation …’
The cable goes onto say, ‘I am not inclined … to believe that our offer to help would be a serious embarrassment to us in Bangladesh’s internal politics as this arrangement would be approved by the new authorities… In sum, I believe that the disadvantages of responding to this request for help from a president who has always been exceedingly friendly to the United States are acceptable and recommend a positive reply.
The following morning, a cable from Kissinger was sent to the Bangladesh embassy confirming that Mushtaque was welcome to the US. (Source)
No comments:
Post a Comment